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Abstract
In 1997, the Ohio senate passed Senate Bill 102 which established the Ohio School Facilities Commission as a
separate agency to oversee the rebuilding projects of the public schools in Ohio. To lower the construction cost,
the bill exempted construction contractors from paying prevailing wages on these projects based on the
hypothesis that this exemption would save the Ohio tax payer 10.7%. Many other studies concluded that these
savings would range from 1.5 to 26%. The purpose of this research was to investigate this hypothesis through the
statistical analysis of 8093 bids received for the schools’ construction from the years 2000 through 2007. Union
contractors- who paid their workers union wages-and non-union contractors- who did not pay prevailing wagesbid these projects. By comparing the bids/SF from both groups (union and nonunion), the hypothesis was tested.
The research indicated that there was no significant difference between the bids for union contractors and the
bids for non-union contractors.

Introduction
The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 and its related acts require that all contractors and subcontractors performing on
federal contracts or federally assisted contracts in excess of $2,000 pay their laborers not less than the prevailing
wage rates and fringe benefits, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, for corresponding classes of laborers and
mechanics employed on similar projects in the area(U.S. Department of Labor, 2008).Generally,the Ohio labor
laws mandate that the laborers working on projects funded by the State of Ohio have to be paid prevailing wages
and benefits. However, in 1997,Ohio Senate Bill 102 of the 122nd General Assembly created the Ohio School
Facilities Commission (OSFC) as a separate and distinct agency to oversee the rebuilding of public schools in
Ohioand exempted construction undertaken by school districts from Ohio's prevailing wage laws (PWL) to lower
the cost of construction to the tax payer. This exemption does not conflict with the federal PWL because this
project was fully funded through the state of Ohio (Burley, 2002).
Considerable literature and news articles debated the merit of PWL; some estimated cost increase of more than
30% and others stated that there would be no cost increases. While these studies agree that Davis-Bacon raises
wage rates and, by implication, costs to the government, there is wide variation in the estimates. Kessler & Katz,
(2001) estimated that the Davis-Bacon Act increased the cost of construction to the federal government from 1.4
to 24%. There are many factors that affect the cost of a construction project which make it difficult to isolate the
impact of PWL from other factors.
The rebuilding of the public schools project in Ohio provided an excellent (but not perfect) opportunity to study
the impact of PWL on prices for the owner. In this study, the authors compared the cost / square foot (SF) from
8093 bids from the years 2000 through 2007. Some of the contractors were union contractors who paid union
wages; and some were non-union contractors who were exempt from paying prevailing wages after the passage of
Ohio Senate Bill 102. These public schools were equitable and built to the same design guidelines and quality
(personal communication with Eric Bode, OSFC). This paper adds to the studies that analyze the impact of PWL
on the cost of construction by presenting a summary of literature against and for PWL followed by the analysis of
8093 bids to build these Ohio public schools.
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Arguments against PWL
PWL increase labor costs, and consequently, the project construction costs. The Ohio Legislative Service
Commission State House (OLSC) in its report titled“The Effects of the Exemption of School Construction
Projects from Ohio’s PWL”estimatedthe exemption saved the Ohio tax payer $487.9 million in aggregate during
the post-exemption period, an overall savings of 10.7%. Estimated savings on new construction projects were
$24.6 million (1.2%), estimated savings on school building additions to be $408.0 million (19.9%),and estimated
savings on school building alterations were $55.2 million (2.7%). Estimated savings in urban counties totaled
$310.5 million (15.13%) while estimated savings in rural counties totaled $177.4 million (8.65%).The report
stated that these savings were at least partially attributable to the prevailing wage exemption, but their research
team could not confidently confirm that this was the case(Burley, 2002).The OLSC report,citingFraundorf,
Farrell, & Mason(1984)in their study of the effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on construction costs in rural areas,
concluded that "a project subject to the Act would cost on average 26.1% more than the same project not subject
to the Act." Fraundorf, et al, stated that the reason for the increase isbased on how workers are utilized.
The OLSC report further elaborated that analyses done in conjunction with the repeal or attempted repeal of the
PWL in Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, andNew Hampshire expected construction
savings of 9.4%. The report cited the following reasons for the cost increase under PWL: (1) PWL reduce
competition - non-union contractors may choose to not bid on a project that is subject to prevailing wage
requirements, reducing competition for union contractors, (2) PWL discriminate against minority and small
contractors, (3) PWL hurt rural contractors and workers, (4) PWL do not guarantee quality, and (5) PWL do not
increase local tax bases.
While empirical evidence related to productivity differentials was mixed, the contention that unions, on average,
significantly raise productivity could not be sustained (Addison & Hirsch, 1989). Freeman and Medoff(1983)
argued that unions reduced profitability in general because their productivity effects, though substantive, were
nevertheless insufficient to offset increases in wage costs and greater capital intensity(Freeman & Medoff, 1983).
Returns accruing from other correlates of market power (e.g., market share, foreign competition, and government
entry restrictions) and from long-lived capital appear to be more important sources of union rents. Union rent
seeking at the expense of long-lived tangible and intangible capital appears to lower firms' investment in physical
capital, as well as to decrease R&D and other innovative and risk-taking activities. As a consequence,
productivity growth tends to be slower in unionized firms and industries (Addison & Hirsch, 1989).
The savings estimates found in other literature are presented in Table 1. Although the studies indicate savings
from the removal of prevailing wage requirements, none of these estimated savings meet the standards of
statistical significance. A statistically significant result is unlikely to have occurred due to chance(Statistical
Assessment Service at George Mason University, 2012).The estimated savings are considerably lower than the 20
to 25% savings that some opponents of PWL have claimed.
Table 1 Estimated Savings (Burley, 2002)
Author(s)
(Thieblot, 1975)
(Gould and Bittlingmayer, 1980)
(Prus, 1996)
(Prus, 1999)
(Phillips, 1999)
(Phillips, 2001)

Savings
0.6%
4 to 7%
5.1%
3.8%
2.4%
0.7%

Arguments for PWL
The studies that refute the argument that PWL increase project costs are based on the premise that higher wages
encourage the use of more productive workers that partially offset the direct effect of higher wages on cost. The
National Heavy and Highway Alliance reviewed and analyzed records for highways built from 1994 through
2002.
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The findings confirmed that when workers skills and productivity justified higher wage rates, highways were built
at the same, or even lower, cost per mile than when lower wage, lower skilled workers were employedas shown in
Table 2 (Construction Labor Research Council, 2004).
Table 2: Wages and the cost per mile (Construction Labor Research Council, 2004)
Average Hourly Wage
Hours Per Mile
Labor Costs Per Mile
Total Costs Per Mile
Difference

Low Wage
$15.68
10, 276
$161,128
$857,965
$31,456

High Wage
$26.34
6,991
$184,138
$826,509

Philips (2001) compared the cost/SF of 201 public schools without PWL to the cost/SF of 190 public schools with
PWL built in Kentucky, Ohio and Michigan from 1991 to 2000. The study concluded that there was no
statistically significant difference between those two groupsafter adjusting for inflation.However, a review of
costs one year after Ohio exempted school construction from prevailing wage requirements showed that the cost
for new school construction increased from $77/SF before the exemption to $90/SF one year later. A more
complex statistical model-that estimated cost/ SF for new public schools-found that school boards could save 10%
of construction costs by starting in the spring compared to winter(Phillips, 2001).
Gillena, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro(2002) evaluated injured construction workers’ perceptions of
workplace safety climate, psychological job demands, decision latitude, and coworker support, and the
relationship of those variables to the injury severity sustained by the workers. There were statistically significant
differences between union and nonunion workers’ responses regarding perceived safety climate. Union workers
were more likely than non-union workers to: (a) perceive their supervisors as caring about their safety; (b) be
made aware of dangerous work practices; (c) have received safety instructions when hired; (d) have regular job
safety meetings; and (e) perceive that taking risks was not a part of their job.
OLSC (2002) also stated the following benefits for prevailing wage laws: (1) PWL protect both the wages and
jobs of local workers by preventing "wage dumping" by outside contractors, (2) PWL reduce total construction
costs by encouraging the use of more qualified and productive workers, (3) PWL assure quality construction and
reduce delays and overruns, (4) PWL help maintain local tax bases, and (5) PWL provide stability in the
construction industry.

Background for the Rebuilding of Ohio Public School Project
The OSFC provides funding, management oversight, and technical assistance to local school districts for the
construction and renovation of the Ohio school facilities in order to provide an appropriate learning environment
for Ohio’s children. The agency builds partnerships with school districts, design firms, construction managers,
and trade contractors to construct quality schools (About OSFC: Mission). The OSFC works with the local
school districts through each stage of construction and breaks the process into the following categories: financial
partnership, facility planning, and project management (About OSFC: What We Do).
The OSFC serves as a funding partner for the school districts to finance their school construction projects. The
program is designed to provide different levels of state funding assistance to the districts according to their
financial abilities (the districts’ assessed property valuation per pupil). In other words, the amount or share of the
total project cost a district paysis based on the property valuation per pupil. This share for each district is
calculated based on the Derolph, v.the state of Ohio(1997)case that preceded the creation of the OSFC. The
calculation ensures that schools throughout the state are “adequate and equitable,” in other words the schools are
similar (personal communication with Eric Bode, OSFC). The OSFC also provides funding assistance in the form
of loans to the districts that need funding (Ohio School Facilities Commission, 2008).
The goal of OSFC is to ensure statewide equity and quality for school facilities using a comprehensive
standardized facilities assessment program and the Ohio School Design Manual (OSDM)to standardize the
process. The OSFC Planning Group is responsible for the assessment and master planning of classroom facilities
for schools participating in the OSFC program.
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As districts are permitted to choose their own architects, the OSDM provides districts and architects with
standards of design and construction that assure a statewide standard of quality (Ohio School Facilities
Commission, 2008).
The Bidding Process of OSFC
OSFC uses an efficient project delivery model utilizing the private sector by employing private construction
management firms to oversee projects. The bidding process for the OSFC projects is similar to that of other
public projects. The process begins with public advertisement to bidders, which divides the work into trade
packages and describes each package. The contractors’ bids are publicly opened, read, and tabulated.Following
the bid-opening meeting, the low bidders are evaluated against predetermined qualifications to determine whether
they are responsible bidders (Ohio School Facilities Commission, 2008).

The Research Problem
There are many factors that affect the cost of a construction project which make it difficult to isolate the impact of
PWL from other factors. As presented earlier, considerable literature and news articles debate the merit of PWL;
some claim estimated cost increases of more than 26% and others claim that there are no cost increases. Labor
unions, from the neoclassical view, use their monopolistic power to raise wages, thereby increasing costs(Byrnes,
Fare, Grosskopf, & Lovell, 1988). From this point of view, it appears obvious that projects completed by union
contractors would bemore expensive than projects completed by non-union contractors. However, it is suggested
that unions reduced turnover, increased quality, and improved productivity (Byrnes et al., 1988). These
conflictingviews raise the question:can unions pay more and still submit a competitive bid due to higher
productivity?The objective of this research was to testthe hypothesis that bids-from contractorswho did not pay
prevailing wages-were significantly less than those from union contractors in the construction of the OSFC
projects.
In order for a trade union to survive and bring the above cited PWL's qualities to the construction
industry, union contractors must be competitive in a capitalistic market. If the compensation differential exceeds
the productivity differential, then non-union firms will underbid union firms; therefore, union contractors will
need to adopt corrective actions to survive. Some examples of these corrective actions include: lower union labor
wages, provide more and better union training, re-evaluate the bidding strategy, utilize equipment more and
worker less, etc. However, if the union workers are more productive than non-union workers, then the union
workers should be able to obtain higher wages without having a negative impact on cost. Unions can use this
research to be more competitive and turn around the decline in union membership that has been occurring since
1979 (Belman & Voos, 2006).

Data Analysis
The OSFC provided the authors with several standard reports that were combined into one spreadsheet. The
collected data for the research included: county name where the school is located, school district, school name,
contractor’s name, contractor’s address, contractor’s trade, contractor’s union affiliation, contractor’s bid amount,
architect/engineers’ (A/E) estimate, and the square footage for eachschool. Upon review of the received data,
nearly half of the bids did not have a union/non-union affiliation of the contractor. Extensive efforts were made
to find out the union/non-union status of every contractor. These efforts included (1) internet search, (2)
contacting the regional union offices across Ohio, and (3) contacting the contractors directly. However, it was not
possible to collect the affiliation for all the contractors because some had disconnected phone lines and/or had
gone out of business. The research team determined the union/nonunion affiliations of the contractors for 8093
out of 8325 bids (97.23%). The total value of the known union/non-union affiliations bids was $12,495,822,258
of the total $12,667,724,130 or 98.64% of all bids based on dollar amount. The bids of unknown contractor
affiliations were deleted from the data set.
Because the schools across the state of Ohio have different sizes, the comparison between union and non-union
bid amounts was faulty. However, the bid amount/SF of the school neutralized the variations in school size.
Therefore, the first step was dividing the bid amount and the A/E’s estimates over the area of the school for every
bid.
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The concentration of unions varied across the state of Ohio; for example, there wasa higher concentration of union
contractors in the northern region of the state than in the rest of Ohio. Investigating the existence of significant
differences between the union and non-union bids /SF in the different regions identified the regions that need
corrective actions. For the purpose of this research, the state of Ohiowas divided into the following three regions:
northern, central, and southern regions as shown in Figure 1. The northern thirdwas made up of 31 counties, the
central was made up of 28 counties, and the southern was made up of 29 counties.

Figure 1. The three regions of the state of Ohio
The lowest bids-for the same work in every school/project -were the most competitive, and they were based on
the most economical method of construction and markup. The research team created another subset of records
that contained only the lowest bid for every contract. Eliminating the inefficient and uncompetitive bids from this
set of data allowed the comparison between the most competitive bids of the union and non-union contractors.
OSFC mostly employed the contractors with the lowest bids; therefore, this was the cost to the owner excluding
the change order cost during construction. The Statistical Consulting Center (SCC) at Bowling Green State
University (BGSU) conducted the statistical analysis of the data.
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The SCC conducted ANOVA analysis using the General Linear Model (GLM) with a 95% confidence level. The
SCC analyzed two data sets: the first consisted of all bids and the second consisted of the lowest bid for the same
work.

Results of the Data Analysis
The GLM analysis tested the hypothesis Ho: significant statistical differences in the bids /SF between union and
non-union contractors existed. The statistical analysis for all bids from the whole state indicated that the
hypothesis Ho should be rejected (i.e. there was no significant statistical difference between union and non-union
bids) for the OSFC projects. Table 3 displays the average and standard deviation (SD); the SD measures the
statistical dispersion of data around the average. The determining factor for the presence of significant statistical
difference was the P-value generated by the GLM analysis. Using a confidence level of 95%, if the P-valuewas
greater than the significance level of 0.05, no significant difference exists. If the P-valuewas less than 5%, a
significant difference between union and non-union bids for OSFC projects exists. A statistically significant
result with a 95% confidence levelindicates that there was a 5% probability that it occurred due to chance. If a
result is not statistically significant, then the measured result is likely to have occurred due to chance. The five
percent line is arbitrary, but has become standard in in many fields of research; statistical significance is the
golden measuring stick for evaluating data(Statistical Assessment Service at George Mason University, 2012).
Table 3 indicates that the average bid/SF for the non-union contractors ($20.49/SF) was greater than that for the
union contractors ($19.22/SF).
Table 3 Result of State Level GLM Analysis Using All Bids
Union / Non-Union Number of Bids Average
$/SF
Union
2,307
19.22
Non-union
4,286
20.49

SD

P-value

Accept / Reject
Ho

25.31
43.03

0.1936

Reject

The analysis of the filtered set of lowest bids indicated that the hypothesis Ho was also rejected and there was no
significant difference between union and non-union bids. Table 4 indicates that the average bid/SF for non-union
contractors is $18.49/SF where the average bid/SF for union contractors are $16.99.
Table 4 Result of State Level GLM Analysis Using the lowest Bids
Union / Non-Union Number of Bids
Union
Non-union

547
949

Average
$/SF
16.99
18.49

SD

P-value

Accept / Reject
Ho

23.54
39.57

0.4199

Reject

The Three Regions Analysis
To identify the locations where significant differences existed between the bids of union contractors and nonunion contractors, the state of Ohio was broken down into three regions as discussed earlier. Table 5 presents the
results of the three region GLM analysis using all bids, and Table 6 presents the results using the filtered set of the
lowest bids. The tables indicate that there wasno significant difference in the bids /SF between union and nonunion contractors in the North and the Central regions. However, there was significant difference between the
bids of union and non-union contractors in the Southern region. The average of the bids/SF of union contractors
was significantly less than that of the non-union contractors in both sets of data in the Southern region.
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Table 5 Results of the Three Region GLM Analysis Using All Bids
Region
North
Central
South

Union / Non-Union

Number of Bids

Average
$/SF

SD

Union

1,804

19.34

24.68

Non-union

2,790

18.16

30.37

Union

168

13.44

17.59

Non-union

447

13.56

18.84

Union

335

21.49

30.98

Non-union

1,049

29.64

69.63

P-value

Accept / Reject
Ho

0.2988

Reject

0.9714

Reject

0.0005

Accept

Table 6 Results of the Three Region GLM Analysis Using Minimum Bids
Region
North
Central
South

Union / Non-Union

Number of Bids

Union
Non-union
Union
Non-union
Union
Non-union

406
679
39
89
102
181

Average
$/SF
17.38
15.54
15.27
11.90
16.08
32.78

SD

P-value

24.66
30.99
20.04
17.23
20.08
65.00

0.3908
0.6067
<0.0001

Accept / Reject
Ho
Reject
Reject
Accept

Conclusion
The overall analysis for the state of Ohio suggested the rejection of the hypothesis Ho: the average of the bids/SF
for the union contractors was not significantly different than the average of the bids/SF for the non-union
contractors. This conclusion was valid in the case of all the bids and in the case of only the lowest bids.
The three region analysis resulted in the rejection of the hypothesis in the Northern and Central regions while the
Southern region resulted in the acceptance of the hypothesis. These results led to the conclusion that there was no
significant difference between bids of union and non-union contractors in the Northern and Central regions of
Ohio. However, the analysis of bids in the Southern region indicated a significant difference between the two
groups with an average union bid of $21.49/SF and an average non-union bid of $29.64.
The definitive reasons for the lack of a statistically significant difference between the bids of the two groups need
to be further researched. Production function studies indicated small overall union impacts on productivity;
positive effects where they existed, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations
and from a natural selection process. Positive union productivity effects were more evident where competitive
pressures are present (Addison and Hirsch 1989). A potential reason for the lack of a statistically significant
difference might be that the wages and benefits for non-union workers were close to those of union workers due
the boom in the construction market during the years from 2001 to 2007. The boom created a shortage in the
skilled workers market, which put a competitive pressure to raise the wages of nonunion workers. Why were bids
of contractors in the southern counties so significantly different? Further research into the bid competitiveness of
the counties in Southern Ohio is an area that deserves further research.
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